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Releasing International Prisoners  
 
Risn Mulgrew 
 
This book looks at who should release and how. The majority of chapters look at this issue from the 
perspective of national criminal justice systems. There is also, however, a functioning international 
criminal justice system with an international prisoner population to be considered for release. This 
chapter will focus on the release systems of two international judicial institutions, the United Nations 
Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
The MICT was created by the UN Security Council,
1
 and one of its core functions is to supervise the 
sentences of imprisonment imposed by the temporary International Criminal Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR).
2
 In addition to making release decisions for persons the 
MICT convicts, the MICT President is also tasked with making release decisions for persons 
convicted by the ICTY and ICTR.
3
 The ICC, the worldsÕ only permanent international criminal court, 
was established by a multi-lateral treaty signed by one hundred and twenty nations in 1998.
4
  
 
The creation of international criminal courts facilitated the punishment of individuals responsible for 
the commission of war-time atrocities. All of the aforementioned courts use imprisonment as their 
primary penalty.
5
 Given the inevitability of international criminal courts imposing lengthy custodial 
sanctions, it may come as a surprise to many that there is no international prison. While the remand 
centres of the ICTY and ICTR did house sentenced international prisoners,
6
 the primary system for 
the enforcement of international sentences of imprisonment involves transferring convicted persons to 
cooperating states to serve their sentences.
7
   
 
While enforcing states are responsible for the day-to-day implementation of international sentences of 
imprisonment, the international courts retain responsibility for the supervision of enforcement. A key 
aspect of this supervision is release. Irrespective of where international sentences of imprisonment are 
served, the power to make release decisions is exclusively granted to the senior international judges of 
the sentencing courts. At first glance, therefore, the international release system appears to operate on 
the basis of international judicial discretion. Further analysis, however, reveals that this description is 
too simplistic. It omits consideration of the constraints placed on judicial discretion by statutory, 
regulatory and treaty provisions. Moreover, it fails to take account of the unique context in which the 
international judiciary must operate and the potential influences that can arise in a penal system totally 
reliant on voluntary state cooperation.  
 
This chapter begins by setting out the legal framework governing release decisions at the MICT and 
ICC and proceeds with discussions of key elements of this framework, namely, eligibility for release, 
the procedure used to make release decisions and the criteria that judges have to consider in reaching 
their decision. It also analyses the subtle yet strong potential influence that states can have on the 
exercise of judicial discretion in the international criminal justice system.  
 
1 The Legal Framework Governing International Release Decisions 
 
Although international judges are tasked with determining if an international prisoner should be 
granted release, the decision-making process is governed by a legal framework established in the 
statutes, rules, practice directions and bilateral enforcement agreements of the international criminal 
courts. As the international criminal justice system lacks a legislature, this legal framework has 
developed differently from those in most national criminal justice systems. 
 
1.1 MICT 
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The legal framework governing release decisions at the MICT is virtually identical to the framework 
governing release decisions at the ad hoc tribunals. Like the ICTY and ICTR,
8
 the MICT was created 
by the UN Security Council and its statute was annexed to the resolution which established it.
9
 The 
statute contains two key provisions relevant to international release decisions. The first states that the 
enforcement of punishment by states is subject to supervision by the MICT.
10
 The second notes that 
only the MICT President can make decisions relating to pardon and commutation of sentence.
11
  
 
Due to the lack of detail in these statutory provisions, it was necessary to elaborate on the release 
procedure elsewhere. Like the judges of the ad hoc tribunals,
12
 MICT judges were empowered to 
adopt the MICTÕs rules of procedure and evidence.
13
 Part Nine of the MICT rules contains three 
provisions relevant to the pardon and commutation of sentence or early release
14
 (dealing with 
notification by states, determination by the President and general standards for granting pardon or 
commutation of sentence, or early release) which mirror the ad hoc tribunalsÕ rules.
15
 
 
Whereas the judges of the ad hoc tribunals granted themselves the power to amend the rules,
16
 the 
MICT judges were granted the power to amend the rules by the UN Security Council.
17
 The MICT 
judges can amend the rules remotely using a written procedure if thirteen judges agree or by the 
majority of judges approving amendments in a plenary session convened by the President.
18
 These 
amendment powers were regularly used by the judges of the ad hoc tribunals: the ICTY rules were 
amended three times a year on average.
19
 On the one hand, the delegation of broad powers to the ad 
hoc tribunal judges to write and amend their own rules has been defended as a necessary means of 
creating the procedure required to ensure the functioning of international tribunals that did not have 
the benefit of relying on established criminal codes or practice.
20
 On the other hand, the grant of 
legislative power to judges that act without oversight or, indeed, any obligation to make the reasons 
for their amendments public,
21
 has been severely criticised on the grounds that such power threatens 
the independence of the judiciary and infringes upon the principles of separation of power and 
legality.
22
 Against this background, the power of the MICT judges to amend the rules is controlled 
internally by the need to ensure that amendments are consistent with statutory provisions
23
 and that 
they cannot operate to prejudice the rights of accused, convicted or acquitted persons in a pending 
case,
24
 but also externally by executive control in the shape of the potential veto of proposed 
amendments by the UN Security Council.
25
 
 
Despite this enhanced external control over the legislative powers of the MICT judges, the rules 
empower the MICT President to issue Practice Directions addressing detailed aspects of the conduct 
of internal proceedings.
26
 President Meron used this power to adopt a Practice Direction on the 
Procedure for the Determination of Applications for Pardon, Commutation of Sentence, and Early 
Release of Persons Convicted by the ICTR, the ICTY or the Mechanism
27
 (PDER), which was drafted 
on the basis of the Practice Directions of the ICTY and ICTR.
28
 While the rules state that the 
President must consult with the Registrar and Prosecutor and ensure that the practice direction is 
consistent with the statute and rules,
29
 the ability to write internal procedure can have significant 
results. In the release context, this power enabled the individual responsible for making release 
decisions to create a procedure whereby his decision is final and not subject to appeal.
30
 
 
Provisions relating to release can also be found in the agreements entered into by cooperating states 
and the sentencing tribunals. The UN delegated authority to the Registrars of the ad hoc tribunals to 
enter into enforcement agreements with states on its behalf. Enforcement agreements outline the core 
conditions that will govern the bilateral relationship, including release. The ICTY
31
 and ICTR
32
 
enforcement agreements, and their provisions on release, will remain in force for the MICT.
33
 
 
 
1.2 International Criminal Court 
 
The relevant sections of the ICCÕs statute and rules are more detailed than those of the ad hoc 
tribunals or MICT. Part Ten of the ICC Statute deals with Ôreview concerning reduction of sentenceÕ 
rather than pardon or commutation of sentence (MICT). Pardon was not deemed to be appropriate for 
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persons convicted by the ICC. The statute clearly states that sentences of imprisonment are binding on 
enforcing states and the right to decide any reduction of sentence is reserved exclusively to the 
Court.
34
 The central provision on release, Article 110, establishes temporal eligibility thresholds,
35
 
sets out the procedure for reviews and some of the factors that should be taken into account.
36
 The 
criteria to be considered and the procedure for initial and subsequent reviews are further elaborated on 
in Rules 223 and 224 of Section V of the rules. 
 
The ICCÕs legal framework can be differentiated from that of ad hoc tribunals as the adoption and 
amendment of the rules has been reserved to the courtÕs management, oversight and legislative body. 
The adoption of and any amendments to the rules require approval from a two-thirds majority of the 
Assembly of States Parties.
37
 While a two-thirds majority of ICC judges can draft provisional rules to 
deal with situations not covered by existing rules in urgent cases, these can also be rejected, adopted 
or amended by the Assembly of States Parties.
38
 All rules and any amendments to them must be 
consistent with the statute and if there is a conflict, the statute will prevail.
39
  
 
While there was no statutory requirement for the ICC to enter into enforcement agreements, their 
conclusion was permitted by the rules.
40
 To date, the ICC has secured eight agreements with countries 
located in Europe, Africa and South America.
41
 Like the MICTÕs agreements, these agreements 
contain provisions which relate to the release process.  
 
1.3 Conclusion 
 
As DÕAscoli notes, Ôthe international system does not have legislative or political structures 
comparable to those of domestic jurisdictionsÉ [therefore] it is actually the executive and the 
judiciary that create the laws and rules of procedureÕ.
42
 The ability of the judges at the MICT and ICC 
to amend the procedure relating to release is constrained by executive or quasi-legislative oversight 
and the requirement to ensure proposals are consistent with statutory provisions. While these 
measures will help to ensure the on-going legal certainty of the release process,
43
 changes may result 
from practice directions, policy documents or precedent. The legal frameworks of both the MICT and 
ICC deal with three key elements of the release process; eligibility for release, the release decision-
making procedure and the factors to be considered. The following sections will discuss these elements 
in greater detail. 
 
2 Eligibility for Release  
 
Although there is no right to release in the international criminal justice system, all of the modern 
international criminal courts have established procedures that enable international judges to consider 
whether international prisoners should be granted a commutation or reduction of sentence. Although 
persons convicted by the ICTY, ICTR and MICT are, in theory, eligible for pardon under the 
domestic law of enforcing states,
44
 this has not occurred to date and, as Klip notes, there are unlikely 
to be impassioned calls for mercy to be shown to international criminals.
45
 As the drafters of the 
Rome Statute felt that pardon was inappropriate for persons convicted of international crimes,
46
 ICC 
prisoners are limited to applying for a revision of their conviction or sentence,
47
 or a reduction of their 
sentence.
48
 The practice of the ad hoc tribunals has demonstrated that what is applied for, and what is 
granted, is early release.
49
 In reality, neither the sentence is reviewed
50
 nor is a reduced sentence 
imposed. Moreover, without a police force, parole or probation system, there are no realistic 
possibilities of supervising released persons or imposing conditions that could result in revocation and 
a return to detention. Release in the international criminal justice system is therefore an irreversible 
and unconditional form of release that results in complete freedom.
51
 The following sections analyse 
how and when prisoners become eligible for release at the MICT and ICC.  
 
2.1 MICT: Eligibility for Pardon, Commutation of Sentence or Early Release 
 
Article 26 of the MICT Statute states that Ôif, pursuant to the applicable law of the State in which the 
person convicted by the ICTY, the ICTR, or the Mechanism is imprisoned, he or she is eligible for 
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pardon or commutation of sentence, the State concerned shall notify the Mechanism accordinglyÕ. The 
legal framework of the MICT,
52
 like the ad hoc tribunals,
53
 would appear to locate the trigger for 
release eligibility in the domestic law of enforcing states. The jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, 
however, reveals that Presidents opted to retain international control over the temporal point for 
eligibility. Moreover, despite having identical legal frameworks, the practice of the ICTY and ICTR 
differed.  
 
2.1.1 ICTY: Presumption of Release and a Two-Thirds Rule of Thumb 
 
Although eligibility under national law has been cited as an essential precondition for consideration 
for release,
54
 the real temporal point for eligibility has been determined by ICTY Presidents. In a bid 
to equalise the treatment of prisoners, ICTY Presidents adopted a rule of thumb whereby prisoners 
only became eligible for release when they had served two thirds of their sentence.
55
 The two-thirds 
point was selected as it was considered to reflect the domestic law of the majority of enforcing 
states.
56
 However, this is not the case for all enforcing states. Prisoners in Belgium can qualify for 
release after serving one-third of their sentence,
57
 while prisoners in the UK,
58
 Austria
59
 and France
60
 
may be eligible at the half-way point of their sentence. In Spain, prisoners must typically serve three-
quarters of their sentence before they are eligible for release. The Spanish penal code only permits 
early release at the two-thirds stage in exceptional circumstances: where the prisoner had progressed 
through three grades of prisoner status, behaved well and displayed a high likelihood of successful 
reintegration into society.
61 
In practice, Spain has applied these provisions flexibly, facilitating the 
release of ICTY prisoners at the two-thirds point.  
 
Arguments that the Tribunal is bound by national law on eligibility where it entitles prisoners to 
release before the two-thirds point, and that the two-thirds rule of thumb is unlawful have been 
rejected on the basis of the statutory stipulation that enforcement is Òsubject to the supervisionÓ of the 
Tribunal (Article 27) and the rule that states that the President must take the treatment of similarly 
situated prisoners into account (Rule 125).
62
 The Òtwo-thirds practice has [therefore] been applied 
consistentlyÉ notwithstanding the domestic law in enforcement statesÓ.
63
 In other words, even were 
prisoners were eligible for release under the domestic law in enforcing states, there were not 
considered to be eligible for release by ICTY Presidents as they had not served two-thirds of their 
sentence.
64
  
 
While called a rule of thumb, ICTY prisoners are therefore considered for release Òonly afterÓ
65
 or 
when Òat leastÓ
66
 two thirds of the sentence had been served. The practice, introduced by the 
TribunalÕs President to ensure equality of treatment of convicted persons, also serves to ensure ICTY 
prisoners serve a minimum period of time in prison before they can be considered for release. The 
discretion to make release decisions has therefore enabled the President to achieve what was 
considered to be beyond the powers of a trial chamber. The ICTY Appeal Chamber in the Stakić case 
held that as the legal framework clearly stated that eligibility for pardon, commutation of sentence or 
early release is to be determined by the national law of enforcing states, the trial chamberÕs direction 
that the prisoner must serve a minimum of twenty years before he could be considered for early 
release was ultra vires.
67 
By interpreting the factor Ôtreatment of similarly-situated personsÕ set out in 
the judge-written rules, to refer solely to the length of time that has been served by other persons 
convicted by the same court, the ICTY Presidents were able to introduce an international rule for 
release eligibility.
 
 
While it was not considered to be a rule by President Pocar in 2008,
68
 it became so ingrained in the 
release jurisprudence and practice of the ICTY that serving two-thirds of the sentence became an 
almost absolute requirement for release eligibility.
69
 To date, there has only been one acknowledged 
exception to the rule: substantial cooperation with the Prosecutor resulted in Mr Obrenović being the 
sole ICTY prisoner to be released before the two-thirds point.
70
 Though it is not written in the statute, 
rules or practice direction, ICTY prisoners are considered eligible for release only after they become 
eligible under the domestic law of an enforcing state and when they have served two-thirds of their 
sentence. It should be noted that the two thirds point marks eligibility for consideration for release, 
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however, and not an entitlement to release.
71 
While the majority of applicants are granted release at 
the two-thirds point, some applications at this point have been rejected.  
 
2.1.2 ICTR: Presumption against release and a three-quarters rule of thumb? 
In contrast, ICTR Presidents did not establish a pre-determined point for release eligibility. Indeed, it 
appeared until recently that they operated on the basis of a presumption against granting release at all. 
Until 2011, prisoners housed in enforcing states and the ICTRÕs Detention Facility (UNDF) in Arusha 
served their sentences in full.
72
 Applications for release were rejected on the basis that submitted 
factors had already been considered in mitigation, the gravity of the crime committed was too high 
and the term remaining to be served did not militate in favour of release.
73
 In 2009, Mr Ruggiu was 
the first person convicted by the ICTR to be released early from an enforcing state, benefiting from 
remission granted by the Italian authorities.
74
  
 
The first instance of early release being granted by an ICTR President occurred in October 2011. Mr 
Bagaragaza was released from prison in Sweden after serving three-quarters of his sentence.
75
 While 
President Khan was keen to note that this decision was Ònot intended to create a precedent for early 
release at three quartersÓ and that Òfuture decisions will continue to be determined on a case-by-case 
basis,Ó
76
 Mr Rugambarara was also granted early release by President Khan just over four months 
later at the three-quarters point.
77
 It is significant to note that in both cases, their guilty pleas and 
significant cooperation with the Prosecutor were strong positive factors in deliberations.
78
 Release at 
the three-quarters point seemed unlikely to be granted to persons who had not provided the same 
degree of assistance. The following month, however, Mr Muvunyi was released from the UNDF at the 
three-quarters point on the basis of this practice,
79
 despite his lack of cooperation with the 
Prosecutor.
80
 Indeed, President Joensen noted that he had served an amount of time in prison that was 
Ôequal to or exceeds that of prisoners who were sentenced at the lesser end of the spectrum for similar 
crimesÕ.
81
 These decisions appear to be put more emphasis on the amount of time served by similarly 
situated prisoners. It is not clear whether the reference to persons sentenced at the lesser end of the 
spectrum was intended to infer that there is or should be a bifurcated approach to release eligibility. It 
may also be debated whether these decisions represented a movement towards the adoption of a three 
quarters rule-of-thumb at the ICTR. All release decisions for ICTR prisoners, are now, however, in 
the hands of the MICT President. 
 
2.1.3 MICT 
 
Practice of the ad hoc tribunals demonstrated that ICTY release decisions were made on the basis of a 
presumption of release at the two-thirds point unless there were significant negative factors militating 
against release, and while the ICTR initially operated on the basis of a presumption against release, 
more recent decisions demonstrated a growing trend of release at the three-quarters stage.  
 
When making the first release decision, the fundamental question facing the MICT President was 
whether to interpret Rule 151 to mean that the Ôtreatment of similarly-situated personsÕ referred to 
other persons convicted by the same tribunal, or persons convicted and sentenced by the ICTY, ICTR 
and MICT.
82
 The MICT President opted to adopt the latter interpretation, and further, the ICTY 
practice of considering prisoners eligible for release after they had served two-thirds of their sentence. 
This was an interesting development, particularly given that the first two applicants for release had 
been sentenced by the ICTR. President Meron defended his decision on the basis of the need to ensure 
equality among all persons supervised by the MICT irrespective of which court they had been 
convicted and sentenced by.
83 
While he recognised the divergent practice of the Tribunals in relation 
to release discussed above,
84
 he felt that the lex mitior principle, as well as the requirements of 
fundamental fairness, dictated that the ICTY practice should be applied uniformly to the entire 
prisoner population supervised by the Mechanism.
85
 Though he acknowledged that Ôthe adoption of 
the two-thirds eligibility threshold might constitute a benefit not previously recognised for persons 
convicted by the ICTR,Õ
86
 he did not feel that this alone could justify discrimination between the 
groups of convicted persons under the jurisdiction of the MICT. Like his ICTY predecessors, 
7 
 
however, he emphasised that the two-thirds rule represented a threshold for consideration for early 
release and not an entitlement to release.
87
 
While the ICTY rule of thumb was created to ensure the equal treatment of ICTY prisoners, it did not 
ensure equal treatment for prisoners serving life sentences.
88
 Without a pre-established international 
point for eligibility, the potential for discrimination will be significant given the vast range of 
temporal points and methods for prisoners serving life sentences to become eligible for parole under 
the domestic law of enforcing states.
89
 The MICT should consider adopting an explicit temporal 
eligibility threshold for release applications from persons serving life sentences. 
 
In addition, the MICT Practice Direction should be amended to include the intervals at which 
applications for subsequent reviews will be permitted. Under the present practice direction, decisions 
denying release should specify the date at which convicted persons next become eligible for 
consideration for release, unless this is specified by the domestic law of enforcing states.
90
 At the 
ICTY, decisions denying release to persons who had not served two-thirds of their sentence did not 
refer to when they would next become eligible under national law but the date at which they would 
have served two-thirds.
91
 Even when enforcing states informed the ICTY of prisoners becoming 
eligible again according to domestic law, the rule of thumb dictated jurisprudential practice.
92
 Perhaps 
eligibility under domestic law is more influential for prisoners who have served the requisite 
minimum amount of time determined appropriate by the President. Given the variations in intervals 
required by domestic law, greater clarity in relation to subsequent reviews would also be welcome. 
 
2.3 ICC: Statutory Eligibility for Review concerning Reduction of Sentence 
 
To avoid the potential for disparity of treatment that arises from reliance on national triggers for 
release eligibility, and the lack of certainty for persons serving indeterminate sentences, the ICC has 
introduced a statutory trigger for release eligibility and mandatory reviews. Pursuant to Article 110(3), 
the Court must review the sentences of prisoners who have served two thirds of a determinate 
sentence, or twenty-five years of a life sentence, to determine whether they should be reduced.
93
 In 
addition to establishing the point at which ICC prisoners will become eligible for an initial review 
concerning reduction of sentence, the statute also establishes a mandatory process for subsequent 
reviews.
94
 According to the rules, such reviews must occur every three years, or at shorter intervals if 
this is determined by the judges in the previous review.
95
 A three year interval seems 
disproportionately long given that prisoners sentenced to the maximum possible determinate sentence 
of thirty years
96
 will become eligible for release after twenty years. If release is denied at the initial 
review, the prisoner will have to serve a third of the remaining term before he can be considered for 
release again. As the majority of determinate sentences are likely to be less than the maximum term, a 
three year interval seems even more excessive. The practice of most European countries is to allow 
subsequent reviews after a couple of months.
97
 While the drafting history of the Rome Statute would 
suggest that the three year term was meant to be applied to persons subject to terms of life 
imprisonment,
98
 this is not clear from the current rule. The rules do however give ICC judges the 
option to conduct reviews at shorter intervals on the basis of a determination made at the initial 
review, or before the regulatory or judicially determined review date if there has been a significant 
change of circumstances.
99
 It would be helpful if the relevant interval for the different types of 
sentences, as well as what is constitutes Ôa significant change of circumstancesÕ could be clarified in 
guidelines.  
 
The ICCÕs introduction of an express statutory trigger for release eligibility introduces transparency, 
predictability and consistency. The statutory requirement for mandatory review
100
 also provides a 
Òpossibility to moderate the lengthy or perpetual characterÓ
101
 of a life sentence. On the other hand, 
this provision seems to severely curtail judicial discretion as it expressly states that no review 
concerning reduction of sentence can be conducted before these fixed time frames.
102
 This rigidity 
reflects the views of some states involved in drafting the statute that persons convicted by the Court 
should serve a significant part of their sentence before becoming eligible for consideration for 
release.
103
 It may also be considered necessary to ensure the equality of treatment of ICC prisoners 
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serving their sentences in a variety of enforcing states. However, equality of treatment should not be 
ensured at the expense of fairness. As Liebling notes Ôfairness is related to, but is more than, 
equality.Õ
104
 Fair treatment, she argues, involves consistent treatment in line with pre-established rules 
as well as flexible and merciful treatment where appropriate.
105
 More specifically, human rights law 
and principles would suggest that the international judiciary should have the inherent power to 
consider applications and grant early release to persons diagnosed with terminal or chronic illnesses 
before these temporal points.
106
 While the rules enable the judges to consider the individual 
circumstances of prisoners, including a worsening state of physical or mental health or advanced 
age,
107
 review before the statutorily determined points for eligibility is not permitted.
108
 
 
2.4 Conclusion  
 
Although there is no right to release in the international criminal justice system, and indeed 
international prisoners may be sentenced to imprisonment for the remainder of their lives,
109
 all of the 
international courts have introduced a system whereby prisoners can be considered for release. 
 
While the MICT President has ensured equality and clarity by adopting the two-thirds rule in relation 
to release eligibility, explicit rules on the temporal eligibility for release for prisoners serving 
indeterminate sentences is required. Moreover, greater clarity in relation to intervals for subsequent 
reviews would also be welcome. 
 
The ICCÕs statute and rules deal with these precise issues. What it gains in certainty and equality, 
however, it lacks in flexibility and possible fairness. While the requirement that prisoners must serve a 
minimum period of time before they can be considered eligible for release is in line with international 
sentencing rationales and victimsÕ expectations,
110
 it is foreseeable that issues will arise that will 
necessitate reviews before these stated points. A human rights approach would suggest that ICC 
judges should have the inherent power to grant release before the stated statutory point if there are 
valid and serious humanitarian grounds.
111
 The ICCÕs rules relating to subsequent reviews would also 
benefit from more precision in relation to the intervals for subsequent reviews and the meaning of 
Ôsignificant change of circumstancesÕ. 
 
3 International Release Procedure  
 
Once an international prisoner is considered to be eligible for release, the international court puts a 
procedure in place to determine if a commutation or reduction of sentence or early release should be 
granted. The MICT procedure, which is virtually identical to the procedure used by the ad hoc 
tribunals, differs from the ICC procedure in several respects. 
 
3.1 MICT  
 
As the MICTÕs statutory and regulatory provisions provide little detail on the matter, the procedure 
was set out in the Practice Direction. This procedure is initiated once an international prisoner 
becomes eligible for release. Although the statute and rules state that enforcing states should notify 
the MICT of a prisonerÕs eligibility,
112
 the MICT Practice Direction enables the President to receive 
direct applications from international prisoners.
113
 This reflects the practice and policy of the ad hoc 
tribunals to accept applications from prisoners serving in enforcing states and international detention 
facilities to ensure equality of treatment.
114
 To date, the President has received two direct applications 
from prisoners serving their sentences in Mali.
115
 
 
As previously stated, the MICT President is responsible for making the decision on whether or not 
pardon or commutation of sentences should be granted.
116
 The Registrar is responsible for preparing a 
file for the President which should include reports on behaviour during incarceration, conditions of 
imprisonment, the prisonerÕs mental condition, cooperation of the convicted person with the Office of 
the Prosecution and any other information the President considers relevant.
117
 The Registrar must also 
inform the convicted person of their eligibility for release, advise him about the steps that will be 
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taken and provide him with a copy of the file prepared for the President.
118
 The prisoner will then 
have ten days to examine the file and send written submissions or make oral submissions to the 
President by video-link or telephone.
119
 
 
In terms of coming to an actual decision, the statutes of the UN Tribunals simply directed the 
President to consult with the other judges.
120
 The rules were amended in 2001 to specify that 
consultation should be with the ÔpermanentÕ judges
121
 and again in 2005 to its current form that states 
that the President should consult with Ômembers of the Bureau
122
 and the permanent judges of the 
sentencing Chamber who remain Judges of the TribunalÕ.
123
 The practice directions were amended to 
reflect these changes.
124
 Although the MICT Statute does not refer to consultation, its rules and 
practice direction specify that the President should consult with any judges of the sentencing Chamber 
who are judges of the MICT about the appropriateness of granting release.
125
 
 
Although the MICT President is directed to consult with these other judges, this may not always be 
possible.
126
 Even if it is possible, he or she is not bound by their views.
127 
The PresidentÕs decision is 
final and is not subject to appeal.
128
 If the President decides that release is appropriate, the Registry is 
tasked with sending the decision to the enforcing state, the convicted person and other interested 
parties.
129
 The President may also direct the Registry to inform persons who testified at the convicted 
personÕs trial about the destination the prisoner will travel to upon release and any other information 
considered relevant by the President.
130
 The decision is usually made public, although the President 
can decide to withhold its publication.
131
 If, the President determines that release is not appropriate, 
the decision should specify the date when the prisoner will next become eligible for consideration for 
release, unless this is specified by the enforcing stateÕs law.
132
  
 
3.2 ICC  
 
The procedure governing reviews concerning reduction of sentences is set out more explicitly in the 
statute and rules of the ICC. The Rome Statute clearly states that Ôthe Court alone shall have the right 
to decide any reduction of sentence, and shall rule on the matter having heard the personÕ.
133
 Once a 
convicted person becomes eligible for a review according to the statute, it is conducted by three 
judges from the Appeals Chamber appointed by that Chamber.
134
 This review will typically involve a 
hearing with the sentenced person (assisted by counsel and interpretation services if necessary).
135
 The 
review panel should invite the Prosecutor, states enforcing penalties or reparations, and victims and 
their legal representatives who participated in proceedings to attend or submit written observations.
136
 
In exceptional circumstances, the hearing can be conducted using video-conference or in an enforcing 
state with a judge delegated by the Appeals Chamber.
137
 The review panel can reduce the sentence if 
it determines that one or more of the factors set out in the statute
138
 and the rules
139
 have been 
established. If release is not granted at the first review, prisoners have a right to be reconsidered for 
release at regular intervals. Subsequent reviews will typically to be conducted by means of written 
representations, although the three judge panel may decide to hold a hearing.
140
 The three judges must 
communicate a reasoned decision to those who participated in proceedings as soon as possible after it 
has been made.
141
  
 
3.3 Conclusion 
 
This section outlined the procedures for making release decisions at the MICT and ICC. Not only do 
they differ in several respects, but key aspects of the procedures may create cause for concern. 
 
Firstly, the MICT will (like the ad hoc tribunals) rely primarily on written submissions from the 
prisoner, although the President may, alternatively,
142
 opt to hear the prisoner via telephone or video-
conference. Initial reviews at the ICC will typically be held ÔwithÕ sentenced persons, although 
hearings via video-conferencing or with a single judge in the enforcing state may be permitted in 
exceptional circumstances. Subsequent reviews at the ICC, in contrast, revert to the MICT preference 
for written submissions, although the possibility of an oral hearing is retained. Given the geographical 
spread of countries that have signed enforcement agreements with the ICC, it is unclear how this 
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preference for oral hearings will work in practice. The Ôcomplex logistical problemsÕ
143
 involved in 
transferring international prisoners or holding three-judge panels in enforcing states make it likely that 
video-conferences and delegated single judge hearings will occur more frequently than envisaged. 
 
The second issue relates to the independence and impartiality of the decision-maker. At the MICT, the 
decision may ultimately rest in the hands of one individual who may have been involved in the case at 
the trial or appeal stages. Although the President is guided by factors that must be considered, and 
consultations with other judges, it is ultimately his or her decision. While the requirement of 
consultation can limit or correct any potential biases of an individual judge,
144 
the release decisions of 
the ad hoc tribunals did not state what the other judges said during these consultations in the majority 
of cases, other than to note whether the decision had been unanimous
145
 or not.
146
 It is clear, that the 
President is free to make a decision irrespective of dissenting views.
147
 Moreover, the creation of a 
new judicial institution (MICT) may mean that it is not possible to consult with sentencing judges, 
leaving the decision solely in the hands of the President.
148
 The concentration of decision-making 
power with one individual, who may have previously been involved in the case, may risk creating 
perceptions of partiality. Furthermore, the approach to release policy and procedure may vary 
according to the views of each new president.
149
  
 
The ICC procedure attempts to avoid these problems by tasking a three judge panel to conduct 
reviews. The ICC Statute also allows for the disqualification of judges from a case if they had 
previously been involved in any capacity.
150
 This article may be used to prevent judges involved in 
trial, appeal or revision proceeding from sitting on the review panel. What remains unclear under the 
ICC system is whether decisions from the three judge panel require a majority or unanimous decision, 
or if a delegated single judge can make a decision alone. These issues should be clarified before the 
first decision on release is made.  
 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, both systems lack provision for appellate review, either 
internally or externally. This sits uneasily with due process and regional penological standards.
151
 
While this lacuna may be understandable to a certain degree at the MICT, given that the President is 
the highest judicial officer and there are no external courts with jurisdiction to review international 
judicial decisions, the ICC does, at least, have the internal option of permitting the Presidency to hear 
appeals or to judicially review decisions made by the appeal chamber judges. 
 
Release decision-making procedures Ôshould meet the requirements of fairness and due processÕ
152
 
and judicial impartiality should be ensured by the creation of a system that can filter out bias or 
correct mistakes.
153
 The concentration of power at the MICT and the lack of review at both the MICT 
and ICC fail on this score. The lack of independence of decision-makers at the ad hoc tribunals and 
the absence of a right to appeal decisions
154
 have been criticised for falling short of contemporary 
human rights standards.
155
 Perhaps release is considered to be an administrative or executive task at 
the MICT but this should not preclude judicial review of decisions. The ICC has an opportunity to 
correct some of these issues, and particularly the question of appeal, before the first application for 
release is received.  
 
4 Factors considered in International Release Decisions 
 
While the release procedure is initiated when international prisoners become eligible for release, 
release decisions are not based solely on the amount of time a prisoner has served. International 
judges must consider a range of criteria set out in the statutes and rules.  
 
4.1 MICT 
 
The provisions of the MICTÕs statute, rules and practice direction that set out the factors that should 
be considered by the President when making a release decision replicate those of the ad hoc tribunals. 
The statutory direction that release decisions should be made in the interests of justice and based on 
general principles of law
156
 does not provide much guidance. The criteria to be considered are 
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therefore expanded in the rules. The relevant rule lists four factors that the President must take into 
account: the gravity of the crime for which the prisoner was convicted, the treatment of similarly-
situated persons, the prisonerÕs demonstration of rehabilitation and cooperation with the Prosecutor.
157
 
This list is not exhaustive, and the practice direction confirms that the President may consider any 
other information deemed relevant.
158
 Before looking at how these factors have been applied at the 
MICT, this section will analyse the jurisprudence of the UN Tribunals. 
 
4.1.1 ICTY 
Although gravity was an express factor, release was often granted ÒnotwithstandingÓ the gravity of the 
crimes the individual had been convicted for.
159
 Later decisions appear to consider gravity in more 
depth by referring to the crimes committed, quoting from sentencing judgments and noting that the 
gravity of the crimes was a factor going against release.
160
 However, release continued to be granted 
despite the high gravity of the crimes committed.
161
 It seems that gravity was only really used as a 
determinative factor militating against release in cases where the individual had not served the 
required two thirds of the sentence.
162
 Rather than viewing Ôthe treatment of similarly-situated 
personsÕ as a separate criterion, ICTY Presidents therefore appear to have used this factor to justify 
the introduction of an implicit international rule on release eligibility. The President was, however, 
obliged to form an opinion on the prisonerÕs demonstration of rehabilitation. ICTY Presidents 
considered a range of issues under this heading, including behaviour in detention, participation in 
work, education and activities, relations with staff and prisoners,
 
expressions of remorse, 
acknowledgements of responsibility, and the prisonerÕs psychological condition, risk of recidivism 
and ability to reintegrate into society upon release.
163
 In relation to cooperation, testimony at other 
international or national trials, active cooperation and/or a willingness to testify were considered to be 
positive factors in support of release.
164
 Mere availability or willingness to testify was not considered 
to be cooperation for this purpose. If cooperation had not been requested by the Prosecutor, this was 
deemed to be a neutral factor.
165
  
 
ICTY Presidents were willing to consider other relevant information
166
 including media material and 
information provided by third parties,
167
 the suffering of the prisonerÕs family due to their loved oneÕs 
conviction and imprisonment,
168
 the physical and mental health of the prisoner, and the adequacy of 
the medical care provided.
169 
Age, by itself, and time spent in isolation due to harassment were not, 
however, considered to be factors pertinent to rehabilitation assessments.
170
   
 
4.1.2 ICTR 
 
The ICTRÕs release criteria exactly mirror those of the ICTY. In contrast to the ICTYÕs practice of 
virtually automatic release at the two-thirds point, however, the consideration of these criteria only 
resulted in two early release decisions at the ICTR from applications from persons serving in 
enforcing states and one from an individual serving his sentence in the UNDF, Arusha. 
 
While the gravity of crimes committed was cited as a reason not to grant early release,
171
 more recent 
decisions held that the high gravity of crimes would not per se bar consideration for release if it was 
otherwise appropriate.
172
 In relation to the treatment of similarly situated persons, the ICTR Presidents 
felt that they were not bound by the ICTY two-thirds rule, and in the cases granting release, found the 
three-quarters point more suitable for persons convicted of genocide-related crimes.
173
 Despite a clear 
reluctance to create a rule of thumb,
174
 it seemed that this factor was beginning to be applied in this 
way in practice.
175
 In relation to rehabilitation, factors previously considered in mitigation, such as 
surrender, guilty pleas, confessions, remorse, acknowledgment of responsibility, were considered to 
be positive factors.
176
 Good behaviour (during trial and in detention) and reintegration potential were 
also considered.
177
 The overriding consideration in the first two release decisions, however, appeared 
to have been the significant value attached to the partiesÕ voluntary, substantial and long-term 
cooperation with the Prosecutor.
178 
This is in stark contrast to the first application for early release, 
when President M¿se declined to consider the applicantÕs cooperation with the Prosecutor, voluntary 
surrender and guilty plea as they had already been considered as mitigating factors in sentencing.
179
 It 
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is noteworthy that the third grant of early release at the three quarters point was granted despite the 
prisonerÕs lack of cooperation with the Prosecutor.
180
 
 
1.3 MICT 
In both release decisions to date, the MICT President held that the high gravity of the applicantsÕ 
crimes militated against the grant of release.
181
 As stated previously, the MICT adopted a two-thirds 
rule of thumb for consideration for release. Service of this requisite period has therefore qualified as a 
factor in favour of release under the heading of Ôtreatment of similarly-situated personsÕ.
182
 Under 
consideration of rehabilitation, the MICT President has acknowledged reports and recommendations 
in support of release from national prison authorities and considered the prisonersÕ views.
183
 
Behaviour in prison, signs of rehabilitation and potential for successful reintegration after release (in 
terms of work, family support etc.) were also important factors.
184
 Though the President referred to 
the relevance of psychiatric and psychological assessments, their absence was not deemed to 
negatively affect the overall assessment of rehabilitation.
185 
The entry of a guilty plea was considered 
to be a factor in favour of release on account of the positive impact such pleas have on the efficient 
administration of justice,
186
 despite objections from the ICTR Prosecutor on the basis that cooperation 
was required by a plea agreement, that it had already been taken into account during sentencing and 
that not all expected cooperation had been forthcoming.
187
 The MICT President also considered 
humanitarian and health issues when making release decisions. This was possible due to paragraph 9 
of the Practice Direction which states that the President may consider Ôany other informationÕ that the 
President considers ÔrelevantÕ and previous ICTY jurisprudence which determined that a serious 
illness may make continued detention inappropriate.
188
 In both cases, medical reports indicating 
treatment for illnesses were considered and appear to have been factors in favour of release.
189
 
4.2 ICC 
 
Article 110 of the statute lists two specific criteria to be applied by the judicial review panel - the 
early and continuing willingness of the person to cooperate with the Court in its investigations and 
prosecutions and the voluntary assistance of the person in enabling the enforcement of the judgments 
and orders of the Court in other cases, in particular, providing assistance in locating assets subject to 
orders of fine, forfeiture or reparation which may be used for the benefit of victims.
190
 This latter 
factor reflects the CourtÕs new penalty options
191
 and powers to order convicted persons to make 
reparations to, or in respect of victims.
192
 While these factors have an obvious administration of 
justice focus, the statute also leaves room for further criteria to be created in the rules that establish Ôa 
clear and significant change of circumstancesÕ.
193
 Rule 223 sets out additional factors to be 
considered, which include conduct in detention which shows a genuine dissociation from the crime 
convicted of, the prospect of resocialisation and successful resettlement, the likelihood that release 
would give rise to significant social instability, any action taken by the prisoner for the benefit of 
victims, the impact of the release on victims and their families and the individual circumstances, age 
or health of the prisoner.
194
  
  
Some factors clearly reflect the human rights and penological approach to release decisions by 
focusing on the likelihood of recidivism, rehabilitation and prospect of successful reintegration into 
society. Other factors reveal a more restorative or transitional approach to international criminal 
justice in that they look beyond the prisoner to determine the impact release will have on victims, 
their families and the wider community. The criteria therefore not only look at how the prisoner has 
dealt with the past and behaved in prison, but also how that individual and the affected community 
will cope post-release. The reference to societal stability should be treated cautiously as it appears to 
be more political than penological, and may be more relevant to considerations related to the 
relocation of the individual after release
195
 rather than a factor that should determine whether or not to 
grant release. The rules also permit the judges to consider individualised health, age and humanitarian 
factors. 
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It is unclear if these factors are exhaustive or if their consideration is mandatory. The statutory 
provision states that the Court may reduce the sentence if it finds one or more of the listed factors or 
those provided in the rules of procedure and evidence.
196
 Does this award discretion to grant release 
only in cases where the specified factors can be established? Rule 223 seems clearer when it states 
that the judges Ôshall take into accountÕ the factors listed in the state and those listed in the Rule. 
While this direction makes consideration of criteria mandatory, it seems to indicate that the list of 
factors is not exhaustive.  
 
Some of the factors that the ICC judges are obliged to consider may create problems as they will be 
difficult for international prisoners to demonstrate. In addition to being clear and explicit, release 
criteria should be realistic and attainable.
197
 Continued detention on the basis that prisoners have not 
fulfilled their sentence plans or demonstrated that they have worked towards release criteria may be 
considered arbitrary, and therefore unlawful, if such prisoners do not have access to the programmes 
necessary for them to do so.
198
 International prisoners often do not have access to offending behaviour 
and other rehabilitation programmes.
199
 Another problem lies with the lack of clarity surrounding who 
has to establish the criteria and how. While it will be relatively easy to establish whether a prisoner 
did something for the benefit of victims, it is likely to be much more difficult to ascertain what impact 
the prisonerÕs release will have on victims, their families and societal stability. What does ÔimpactÕ 
mean? Will the determination be based on a subjective judicial judgment call or objective empirical 
evidence?  These issues could benefit from clarification. 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
 
The MICT President has had to consider the same range of factors as the ad hoc tribunal Presidents. 
The ICTRÕs adoption of the ICTY rules should have promoted more harmonious results at the two 
tribunals.
200
 The decisions, however, demonstrate that their approach to release was markedly 
different. The main disparity in practice resulted from the different temporal guides for eligibility 
generated by the Presidential interpretation of the Ôtreatment of similarly-situated personsÕ factor. 
ICTY Presidents adopted a two-thirds point to ensure equality of treatment, while later ICTR 
Presidents (Khan and Joensen) insisted that prisoners serve a minimum of three-quarters of their 
sentence to reflect the higher gravity of crimes. Moreover, practice seems to indicate a presumption in 
favour of early release at the ICTY and a presumption against early release at the ICTR. Cooperation 
with the Prosecutor was the only factor to create exceptions to the established practice of the 
respective Tribunals. The ICTY released Mr Obrenović before the two-thirds point due to his 
exceptionally substantial cooperation
201
 and the only two instances of early release being granted by 
the ICTR to persons serving their sentences in enforcing states were mainly attributed to the 
voluntary, substantial and long-term cooperation of the convicted persons. The adoption of an explicit 
two-thirds rule of thumb by the MICT will ensure a greater degree of consistency in the release 
process and its outcomes. However, this consistency, and indeed the judicial nature of the decision, 
may be short-lived. In spite of the fact that international sentences imposed by the UN tribunals will 
require supervision until 2030 at the earliest,
202
 the MICT was only granted an initial four year 
mandate, extendable for two year periods.
203
 It is highly likely that the power to make release 
decisions will be transferred to another body to be established by the UN Security Council at a later 
stage.
204
 
 
The ICC judges are obliged to consider factors set out in the statutes and rules that address the 
administration of justice, enforcement of penalties, rehabilitation, reintegration, victimsÕ rights and 
societal stability. It is significant to note that the ICC judges do not have to consider the gravity of 
crimes committed by the individual.
 
This development is to be welcomed given that the gravity was 
already one of the most powerful determinants of the sentence imposed.
205
 It is apparent that while 
some of the ICC factors may be more relevant in the international criminal justice context, some of 
them seem difficult to establish, whether from the prisonerÕs perspective or more generally. These 
factors would therefore benefit from some clarification. It may also be helpful to outline the weight 
that should be attributed to each factor.
206
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Overall, the MICT factors are backward-looking, whereas the ICC factors are more forward-looking. 
Though an obligation to consider criteria set out in the statutes and rules may constrain judicial 
discretion, this duty was considered necessary to ensure the equal treatment of prisoners convicted by 
the international courts who must serve their sentences in a myriad of different countries, even 
continents.
207
 
 
5 Potential Influences on International Judicial Discretion  
 
Although states enforce international sentences of imprisonment in their national prison systems, the 
power to make release decisions has been reserved for the international judiciary. The international 
judiciary is comprised of judges, diplomats, academics and legal advisers with experience in criminal, 
international humanitarian and human rights law from a range of countries that represent the worldÕs 
principle legal systems.
208
 While personal backgrounds and professional experiences are recognised 
potential influences on judicial reasoning, research has indicated that international judges generally 
adopt a legal-facts model of decision-making, which involves basing decisions on legal criteria and 
case specific facts.
209
 Even though the structure of international release decisions to date would seem 
to verify that this approach has been adopted, it cannot be ignored that international judges have to 
make decisions in light of the Ôspecial challengesÕ
210
 involved in operating an international criminal 
court.  
 
In contrast to national criminal justice systems, the international criminal justice system does not have 
the necessary apparatus required to function independently.
211
 There is no international police force, 
parole or probation service or prison. Wessel notes that while international judges may be better 
insulated from influence from their state of origin than national judges, their Ôstrategic concerns are 
more nuancedÉ. Rather than worrying about their personal removal from the benchÉ [they] must be 
concerned with the subtle impact of their decisions on the Court as an institutionÕ.
212
 Therefore despite 
the fact that international judges are granted the sole power and discretion to grant or deny release, 
they are aware that their decisions have to be implemented in a penal system that is completely 
dependent on state cooperation.  
 
The statutory and regulatory obligation placed on international judges to consider administration of 
justice and enforcement of penalties criteria highlights the pressure the international judiciary is under 
to ensure the continuing functionality of the international criminal justice process. Indeed, some states 
involved in drafting the ICCÕs statute went so far as to suggest that cooperation with the Prosecutor 
should be the principal or only ground upon which early release should be granted.
213
 Despite the 
repeated judicial assertion that a lack of or limited cooperation is not viewed negatively,
214
 it is 
obvious from the ad hoc tribunalsÕ practice that it can exclude a prisoner from consideration for 
release at the earliest point possible. A less obvious, but perhaps more significant aspect of the 
system, is that states are not under any obligation to implement international sentences of 
imprisonment. The entirely voluntary nature of cooperation enables states to directly and indirectly 
exert pressure on the international judiciary through the inclusion of conditions in their enforcement 
agreements, the transmission of orders or recommendations in relation to sentenced reductions or 
release, and ultimately, their ability to withdraw cooperation. 
 
The consensual nature of the enforcement system has resulted in states being permitted to include 
conditions in their bilateral agreements with international courts which enable states to reserve the 
right to make national decisions on whether or not particular international prisoners should be granted 
release. While no enforcing state can release an international prisoner before the expiration of the 
sentence imposed by the international court, some states have reserved the right to choose whether or 
not to continue enforcing the sentence or to terminate the enforcement of the sentence in their prison 
system and to transfer the prisoner elsewhere in the event of a disagreement with the PresidentÕs 
decision.
215
 Others left the decision to the tribunal.
216
 In fact, only half of the agreements concluded 
by the ad hoc tribunals followed the statutory scheme and state that the enforcing state will act 
according to the PresidentÕs decision.
217
 Treaty provisions which reduce the PresidentÕs power to a 
consideration of the appropriateness of the recommendations or decisions of national authorities were 
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accepted due to the need to respect state sovereignty, domestic law and secure timely cooperation.
218
 
This flexibility has however resulted in release being viewed by some states as an issue of shared 
competence.  
 
ICTY judges expressed concern that some enforcing states appeared to be assuming more 
responsibility in relation to release decisions than the statute permitted.
219
 Even though the statute 
clearly stated that the power to make decisions on release lay solely with the President, some national 
authorities did more than simply notify the tribunal of a prisonerÕs eligibility for release. For example, 
national judges granted early release to international prisoners, subject to an authorising decision from 
the ICTY President
220
 and state authorities notified the ICTY of decisions not to grant release.
221
 
ICTY release jurisprudence also reveals that national officials, prisons, local or central authorities 
made explicit recommendations on whether or not an individual should be released.
222
 National rules 
on sentence remission and reduction may also result in recommendations for significant reductions to 
the length of sentences international prisoners must serve. For example, Mr Santić was entitled to 302 
days of benefit under the Spanish system,
223
 Mr Martinović qualified for 765 days of a sentence 
reduction under the Italian system
224
 and a French judge recommended that Mr Radić be granted a 
four years and three months reduction from his twenty year sentence.
225
 These entitlements have been 
taken into account by ICTY Presidents in the determination of whether an international prisoner is 
eligible for consideration for release. 
 
Despite the concern expressed about this national interference with release procedures at the ad hoc 
tribunals, it appears that the relevant provisions in enforcement agreements with the ad hoc tribunals 
will remain in force for the MICT.
226
 Indeed, the MICTÕs Practice Direction explicitly notes that 
enforcing states may not agree with or be able to accept the PresidentÕs decision on release, and if this 
situation should arise, the President, in consultation with the Registrar, may decide to transfer the 
prisoner to a different state to serve the remainder of their sentence.
227
 
 
The ICCÕs legal framework tried to avoid this situation arising in the first place by prohibiting the 
inclusion of conditions in enforcement agreements that deviate from the statutory scheme governing 
release.
228
 To date, the provisions of all of the ICCÕs enforcement agreements, bar one, reflect the 
statutory position that enforcing states are bound by the duration of the international sentence and that 
the ICC has the sole authority to make release decisions.
229
 It is unfortunate, however, that the 
agreement with Denmark deviates from this position. For example, Article 12(3) of the agreement 
states that Denmark will notify the ICC when the international prisoner becomes eligible for early 
release or pardon under domestic law. This ignores the fact that the ICC statutes determines release 
eligibility and pardon is not permitted. Perhaps more worryingly, it goes on to state that in the event 
that Denmark disagrees with the CourtÕs view on the appropriateness of early release or pardon, the 
Court may transfer the prisoner to another state.
230
 It appears that this agreement was erroneously 
drafted on the basis of the legal framework of the ad hoc Tribunals. It is unclear if this agreement will 
establish precedent for other states to demand similar conditions in their enforcement agreements. 
 
While flexible conditions may be necessary to ensure cooperation, their acceptance results in a release 
system that can place considerable influence on those responsible for making release decisions. 
Irrespective of whether or not deviating provisions are included or permitted in enforcement 
agreements, enforcing states can still influence international release policy. Prison authorities often 
exercise significant de facto influence over release decisions, even when they are not the body 
formally charged with making them.
231
 While international courts are independent in one sense, they 
are also interdependent insofar as they cannot operate without the support of states.
232
 States can 
therefore exert pressure on international judges by implicitly or explicitly threatening to partially or 
completely exit the enforcement regime.
233
 For instance, many believe that it was the Rwandan 
GovernmentÕs withdrawal of cooperation, and not the discovery of new facts, that resulted in a 
reversal of the ICTR decision to release Jean Bosco Barayagwiza.
234
 While both the ICC and MICT 
can terminate enforcement in a particular state and transfer a prisoner elsewhere to serve the 
remainder of their sentence should an enforcing state disagree with or be unable to accept the 
international judicial decision in relation to release,
235
 this measure will only be used in extreme cases. 
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With no international prison, a finite number of conditional enforcement agreements and the ICCÕs 
duty to ensure the equitable distribution of the burden of enforcement,
236
 the MICT President and ICC 
appeal judges will be acutely aware of the limited options available to facilitate continued 
enforcement elsewhere. While the ICC has the additional option of access to a residual facility 
provided by the host state,
237
 the Dutch Government has made it clear that this is to be used as a 
measure of last resort and for short term periods only. 
 
International judicial discretion may be influenced by the unavoidable reality that international courts 
rely on states to provide the prison cells in which international sentences of imprisonment are 
enforced.
238
 International judges may therefore use unconditional early release as a means to reduce 
the length of sentences to be served by international prisoners to ensure the continued and future 
cooperation from states. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has outlined the release schemes at the two international institutions that will be 
responsible for making the majority of international release decisions, the MICT and the ICC. The 
MICT relies on one judge, the President, to make a decision following consultation with other judges 
on the basis of eligibility determined by the national law of enforcing states, factors outlined in the 
statute and rules and written information provided by the Prosecutor, the enforcing state and the 
convicted person. The ICC, on the other hand, relies on a panel of three appeal chamber judges to 
make a decision on the basis of eligibility determined by the courtÕs statute, factors outlined in the 
statute and rules, the views of the Prosecutor, enforcing state and victims conveyed at a hearing 
conducted with the sentenced person. Aspects of both schemes require clarification or elaboration, 
and it is unfortunate that neither procedure grants international prisoners the right to appeal release 
decisions.  
 
Judicial discretion in international release decision-making is important to ensure that a flexible 
approach can be taken in individual cases. This discretion is constrained, to a certain extent, by 
eligibility requirements and the need to consider factors set out in the relevant statute, rules or practice 
direction. A mandatory obligation to consider a core set of pre-determined factors enhances equality 
of treatment and legal certainty. Despite the elucidation of these factors, it remains unclear what the 
objective of international release decisions should be or what goals international punishment should 
achieve.  
The UN TribunalsÕ focus on retribution (and proportionality)
239
 at the sentencing stage may be the 
cause of the focus on the time international prisoners have served in release decision-making, with 
institutional effectiveness and efficiency concerns focusing attention on cooperation with the 
Prosecutor. These elements are relatively easy for international tribunals to determine. What is more 
difficult to determine is whether or not international prisoners have demonstrated signs of 
rehabilitation. In this regard, the international judiciary is dependent on reports from national 
authorities. These reports often focus on good behaviour in prison and participation in work and 
education, as national prisons often do not provide access to relevant offending behaviour 
programmes. While national reports do contain sections on the prisonerÕs psychological condition and 
risk of recidivism,
240
 some have been treated cautiously due to difficulties encountered in supplying 
accurate accounts due to linguistic and cultural barriers.
241
 Moreover, the risk of recidivism is often 
classified as low due to the fact that the conflict situation no longer exists.
242
 This may be the reason 
why there is no international parole or probation system. Only international prisoners granted leave to 
remain in the enforcing state will be subject to a licence or supervision. All deported international 
prisoners will be released unconditionally.  
The MICT has inherited the release system of the UN Tribunals. ICC appeal chamber judges will 
have to consider a broader range of factors than the MICT President, many with a more restorative or 
transitional justice focus. For example, they will have to determine the impact release will have on 
victims and social stability. Such decisions should not be based on subjective judicial opinion. While 
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it may constitute a constraint on judicial discretion, clear and objective criteria should be developed to 
determine such issues and assessments should be strictly related to the risk posed by the individual 
prisoner.  
Both the MICT and the ICC have adopted the enforcement system used by the UN Tribunals Ð the 
international sentencing court delegates the practical task of sentence implementation to cooperating 
states. While states agree to act as the custodians of international prisoners, the international courts 
remain the custodians of the sentences being enforced. The international nature of the sentence 
dictates that an enforcing state should not be able to reduce the term of imprisonment to be served or 
release an international prisoner against the wishes of the sentencing court.
243 
To ensure that modern 
international criminal courts could prevent pressure being put on domestic authorities to prematurely 
release international prisoners,
244 
enforcing states agree to respect the length of the sentence imposed 
by the international court and not to release international prisoners without the international courtsÕ 
permission. They may not, however, agree to respect an international judicial decision not to grant 
release to a particular individual at a particular point in time. In such instances, prisoners in some 
enforcing states may have to be transferred elsewhere to serve the remainder of their sentences. 
Therefore, in addition to the constraints placed on international judicial discretion by statutory and 
regulatory rules governing eligibility, procedure and factors to be considered, the systemÕs complete 
reliance on state cooperation may result in strong pressure to grant early release. Until such time as 
international criminal courts can directly enforce their own sentences of imprisonment in international 
facilities,
245
 it is foreseeable that capacity and cooperation concerns will have the potential to 
influence international judicial release policy and decisions.  
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